This paper presents a general result for simultaneous reform of tari¤s and quotas in a small open economy, where some of the quota rents do not accrue to domestic residents. Absent highly perverse income e¤ects, welfare must rise following a uniform proportionate reduction in tari¤s and a uniform proportionate relaxation of quotas, weighted by their rent-retention parameters. Previous results are shown to be special cases of this one, and its implications for practical policy advice and its relationship with the policy of "tari¢ cation" of quotas are noted.
Introduction
The theory of piecemeal policy reform seeks rules of thumb for small policy changes which will guarantee an improvement in welfare, even when little detailed information on the structure of the economy is available.
For changes in trade policy, the best-known result of this kind, associated with Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) , Bruno (1972) and Hatta (1977a) , is that welfare must rise if all tari¤s are reduced by the same proportion. 1 Falvey (1988) showed that this result also holds in the presence of "pure"quotas, where all the quota rents accrue to domestic residents. 2 However, most real-world quantitative restrictions imply some loss of rents, typically mid-way between pure quotas and voluntary export restraints (VER's) where all rents accrue to foreign exporters and so are lost to the domestic economy. The theory has been extended to take account of such mixed cases by Anderson and Neary (1992) , but they did not present any results for simultaneous reform of tari¤s and quotas. This paper extends the theory of trade liberalization to derive a general result for simultaneous reform of all trade policies, when trade is distorted by quotas as well as tari¤s and when quota-constrained imports di¤er in the share of rents retained by the importing country. Crucially, the result does not require any special assumptions about the structure of the economy. An alternative tradition derives results which hold under reasonable but nevertheless demanding restrictions on tastes and technology, for example, that some or all goods are general-equilibrium substitutes, as in Hatta (1977b) and Falvey (1988) , or that tari¤-constrained and quota-constrained goods are implicitly separable as in Anderson and Neary (1992) . Though these results are of independent interest, it is clearly very desirable to …nd results which hold more generally.
Section 2 reviews the approach to modelling aggregate behaviour in the presence of tari¤s and quotas developed in Anderson and Neary (1992) . Section 3 presents the model of the economy and derives expressions for the marginal welfare e¤ects of changes in tari¤s and quotas which generalise those of Anderson and Neary (1992) . These properties are then used in Section 4 to derive the main result of the paper. This section also explains the intuitive basis for the result, shows that it nests many previous reform rules in the literature, and relates it to the policy of "tari¢ cation" of quotas which was implemented in the Uruguay Round of trade liberalisation. 1 Foster and Sonnenschein provided the …rst formal proof in the multi-commodity case, assuming that all goods are normal; Bruno showed that this assumption could be replaced by the much weaker assumption that the shadow price of foreign exchange is positive (see Section 3 below for details); and Hatta (1977a) provided a simple proof using the expenditure function.
2 Other papers which extend the theory of trade liberalization to take account of quotas (or of non-traded goods, which are formally equivalent to prohibitive quotas), include Hatta (1977b) , Fukushima (1979) and Corden and Falvey (1985) . The presentation here draws mostly on Anderson and Neary (1992) and Neary (1995) . See also Lahiri and Raimondos (1996). the economy is then most conveniently summarized by the trade expenditure function. With two categories of goods this is de…ned as: E( ; p; u) e( ; p; u) g( ; p);
( 1) where e( ; p; u) and g( ; p) are the household expenditure and GDP functions respectively. By Shepherd's Lemma, the price derivatives of the trade expenditure function give the compensated net import demand functions for the t-and q-goods which apply in the absence of quotas:
Since the trade expenditure function is concave in f ; pg, each of these import demand functions is nonincreasing in its own price. For convenience we will assume that they are strictly decreasing in their own price, and, more generally, that the matrices E and E pp are negative de…nite. 3 The trade expenditure function may also be de…ned in an alternative way which will prove useful below:
where U (m 0 ; m; q) is a Meade trade utility function de…ned over net imports m 0 , m and q rather than …nal consumption. 4
When the q-goods are restricted by binding quotas we need to adopt a di¤erent approach. Following Anderson and Neary (1992) , we therefore introduce a new function, the distorted trade expenditure function.
This equals net spending on the tari¤-constrained goods conditional on the quota levels:
Viewed as a function of and u for given q, the distorted trade expenditure function behaves just like the standard trade expenditure function. The derivative ofẼ with respect to u is the marginal cost of utility e u , and, invoking Shepherd's Lemma once again, its derivatives with respect to equal the compensated import demand functions for the t-goods conditional on the quotas:
These quota-constrained demand functions have properties with respect to similar to those of the unconstrained demand functions (2). In particular:
Lemma 1 :Ẽ is concave in , and so the matrix of own-price derivatives of the quota-constrained demand functions for the t-goods, e m c , which equalsẼ , is negative de…nite.
Heuristically, the compensated net import demand functions for the t-goods slope downwards.
What about the properties of the distorted trade expenditure function as a function of the quota constraints? To derive these, note that the distorted and undistorted functions can be related provided the domestic prices of the quota-constrained goods are market-clearing. 5 More precisely:
where the market-clearing price vector p is de…ned implicitly by:
Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to q and using (8) to simplify gives an explicit expression for the prices p:
Thus the derivatives of the distorted trade expenditure function with respect to the quota levels equal minus the inverse demand functions for the quota-constrained goods, expressing their market-clearing prices as functions of the exogenous variables. The key property of these inverse demand functions is given by the following:
Lemma 2 :Ẽ is convex in q, and so the matrix of derivatives of the inverse demand functions for the q-goods with respect to the quota levels, p q , which equals Ẽ, is negative de…nite.
(See Anderson and Neary (1992) for a formal proof.) Heuristically, the compensated inverse demand functions for the q-goods slope downwards.
The Welfare E¤ects of Changes in Trade Policy
The distorted trade expenditure function summarizes the behaviour of the private sector and it only remains to specify public sector behaviour, which is purely redistributive. It is standard to assume that all tari¤ revenue is redistributed in a lump-sum manner to the aggregate household. However, the same assumption is not plausible in the case of quota rents. Instead, we assume that a fraction ! j of the quota rents on each good j is lost to the domestic economy. As noted in the Introduction, ! j is zero in the case of a pure quota and one in the case of a VER. Total quota rents retained at home and redistributed to households therefore equal j (1 ! j )(p j p j )q j . In matrix form this can be written as (p p ) 0 (I !)q, where I is the identity matrix and a bar under a vector denotes the corresponding diagonal matrix (so ! is a diagonal matrix with the rent-loss shares on the principal diagonal).
Armed with the properties of the distorted trade expenditure function and our assumptions about the disposition of quota rents, we are now ready to specify the general equilibrium of the economy. In equilibrium, net expenditure on the numeraire and on tari¤-constrained goods (5), plus net expenditure on quota-constrained goods p 0 q, must equal tari¤ revenue t 0 m plus retained quota rents (p p ) 0 (I !)q:
The …rst step toward deriving the welfare e¤ects of trade policy reform is to totally di¤erentiate equation (10). (We simplify by using (6), (9) and the fact that d = dt. We also assume for the present that the rent-loss parameters ! are constant, so we ignore terms in d!.) This yields:
This equation does not give the full e¤ect of changes in trade policy, because the terms in dm and dp are endogenous. Nevertheless, it is very helpful in providing intuition. Consider in turn the three terms on the right-hand side. The …rst shows that, as in standard models where tari¤s are the only distortion, welfare rises if the tari¤-weighted volume of tari¤-constrained imports increases, or, equivalently, if tari¤ revenue rises at the initial tari¤s. The second shows that, other things equal, welfare rises when quotas are relaxed (except for VER's where ! i = 1, so all the rents are lost). Finally, the third term shows that welfare also rises when the domestic prices of quota-constrained goods fall, since (except for pure quotas where ! i = 0) this reduces total rents and hence reduces the amount transferred to foreigners.
The next step is to use the di¤erentials of (6) and (9) to eliminate the endogenous terms dm and dp from (11). This yields the basic equation for the welfare e¤ects of changes in trade policy in the presence of tari¤s and quotas:
As in Anderson and Neary (1992) , the coe¢ cient of the change in real income e u du can be interpreted as the inverse of the shadow price of foreign exchange, , which measures the e¤ect on welfare of a unit transfer of the numeraire good. Writing it in full: 6
Any increase in real income has a multiplier e¤ect which is greater than one to the extent that it raises demand for tari¤-constrained imports. O¤setting this, when the rent-loss parameters ! i are strictly positive, the multiplier e¤ect is dampened to the extent that incipient increases in demand for quota-constrained goods push up their domestic prices and so increase the amount of rents lost. Because of the combined e¤ect of these in ‡uences, may be either greater or less than unity. In any case, we assume throughout that it is positive. 7
The welfare e¤ect of trade reform, or the marginal cost of protection, therefore depends on the coe¢ cients of changes in the policy variables in (12), which we call the marginal costs of tari¤ s:
6 To derive this we express the cross-derivatives ofẼ with respect to prices and utility in terms of the derivatives of the distorted Marshallian import demand and virtual price functions with respect to income:Ẽ u =m I eu andẼqu = p I eu.
7 This may be rationalised on stability grounds or by invoking a minimal degree of rationality of government policy. Alternatively, we can look for su¢ cient conditions to sign the individual terms. The term in which does not appear in the absence of quotas is q 0 !p I . This can be shown to equal q 0 !E 1 pp q I . Alternative su¢ cient conditions for this to be positive are: (a) from Hatta (1977a) , that the q-goods are normal in demand and net substitutes; and (b) from Anderson and Neary (1992) , that ! i is the same for all goods and that the q-goods are homothetic in demand and have uniform import shares (so that q I = q=I, where is the common import share). and the shadow prices of quotas respectively:
These formulae generalise the results of Anderson and Neary (1992) to allow for rent-loss parameters which di¤er across commodities. They are the central equations of the paper.
Simultaneous Trade Policy Reform
As explained in the introduction, we seek a rule for simultaneous changes in tari¤s and quotas which guarantees a welfare improvement without the need to place restrictions on the structure of the economy. It transpires that such a rule can be devised by combining two results already in the literature. The …rst is the radial reduction in tari¤s result, discussed in the introduction. The second is a result due to Anderson and Neary (1992) , who showed that, in the absence of tari¤s, welfare must rise following a uniform relaxation of quotas weighted by their rent-loss parameters. 8 Combining these results, provided both sets of distortions are relaxed at the same rate, a welfare improvement is assured.
We …rst state the new result formally:
Proposition 1 : Assume that the shadow price of foreign exchange is positive. Then a uniform proportionate reduction of tari¤s combined with a uniform proportionate relaxation of quotas, weighted by the share of rents lost on each quota-constrained good, with both proportionate changes at the same rate, must raise welfare.
Proof : The policy rule implies that dt = td and dq = !qd , where d is a positive scalar. Substituting in (12), and using the expressions for and from (14) and (15), the change in welfare is:
All three terms on the right-hand side of this expression are positive scalars, the second because all its individual terms are positive, and the …rst and third because they are minus quadratic forms in negative de…nite matrices, from Lemmas 1 and 2 respectively. Hence a welfare gain is guaranteed.
While the proposition is not di¢ cult to prove, providing intuition for it is more of a challenge. One approach to doing this is mathematical. Recall from Lemmas 1 and 2 that the function e E is concave in (and hence, for given world prices, in t) and convex in q. This implies that the second-derivative matrices e E and e Eare negative de…nite and positive de…nite respectively. Hence the expressions t 0 e E dt and q 0 ! e Edq are both positive when dt = td and dq = !qd , since they are quadratic forms in the positive de…nite matrices e E and e E. Lemma 3 in the Appendix shows that this result can be extended to prove that for such a function the expression x 0 e E xx dx is also a positive quadratic form, where x is a vector formed by stacking the two vectors t and !q, and dx is such that dt = td and dq = !qd .
To appreciate the economics underlying the proposition, consider the individual terms on the right-hand side of (16). From equation (11), the second term re ‡ects the e¤ects of the quota relaxation at given import volumes m and domestic prices p. Fixing m and p in this way rules out second-best complications, so any quota reform must raise welfare since it reduces the amount of rents lost. A quota reform of the type dq = !qd must strictly raise welfare provided that not all quotas have either zero (! i = 0) or full (! i = 1) rent loss.
As for the …rst and third terms on the right-hand side of (16), these re ‡ect the direct e¤ects of the tari¤ and quota reforms. The …rst term, t 0mc t, re ‡ects the welfare gain arising from the increase in imports of the t-goods following a uniform proportionate reduction in tari¤s. The third term, q 0 !p q !q, re ‡ects the welfare gain arising from the reduction in domestic prices p of the q-goods (with a consequent fall in rents lost) following a uniform proportionate relaxation of !-weighted quotas. The fact that these direct e¤ects on welfare are unambiguously positive is well-established in the literature. 9
The trade reforms also have indirect e¤ects, which might be expected to render their net impact on welfare ambiguous. These indirect e¤ects are captured by two additional terms (not shown in equation (16)) which appear in the full expression for du, and which are indeterminate in sign : t 0 e m c q !q and q 0 !p t.
However, these two scalars cancel, because e m c q (which equals e E q ) is the transpose of p (which equals e E q ). In words, the e¤ect of the uniform quota relaxation on tari¤ revenue is exactly equal to the e¤ect of the uniform tari¤ reduction on lost quota rents. Crucial for this result is the assumption that both types of trade distortion are relaxed at the same rate. As a result the indirect e¤ects play no role and the net e¤ect of the trade reform on welfare is unambiguously positive. 9 Hatta (1977b) and Fukushima (1979) showed that a uniform proportionate reduction in tari¤s must raise welfare in the presence of non-traded goods, provided all goods are net substitutes. Falvey (1988) extended this result to tari¤ reductions in the presence of quotas with full retention, and Neary (1995) showed that the quali…cation of net substitutability is unnecessary. As for a uniform proportionate relaxation of !-weighted quotas, Anderson and Neary (1992) showed that this must raise welfare in the absence of tari¤s.
It is clear that Proposition 1 encompasses as special cases all the results already in the literature for uniform proportionate relaxations of trade distortions in a small open economy. 10 This is true of the results of Hatta (1977a) , Falvey (1988) and Neary (1995) that a uniform proportionate reduction in tari¤s raises welfare either when quotas are absent or when all quota rents are retained. It is also true of the result of Anderson and Neary (1992) that, in the absence of tari¤s, a uniform proportionate relaxation of quotas raises welfare with partial rent retention. 11 All these results are corollaries of Proposition 1 since they apply only in special cases when one set of trade policy instruments is either absent (no tari¤s in the case of quota relaxations only) or benign (full rent retention in the case of tari¤ reductions only).
Finally, Proposition 1 highlights the importance in trade policy reform of taking account of the rents lost to the domestic economy. While some authors have argued that this consideration also applies to tari¤s (see in particular the discussion of "revenue seeking" by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) ), it seems most serious in the case of quotas. This suggests that the model should have implications for the issue of "tari¢ cation": abolishing quantitative restrictions and replacing them by their equivalent quotas. This policy switch was applied to agricultural trade in the Uruguay Round for example. In the present model, it is equivalent to a combination of two policies: …rst, a switch from the economy described by equation (10) where behaviour is summarised in terms of the distorted trade expenditure function to an otherwise identical economy expressed in terms of the undistorted trade expenditure function (1); and second, a reduction in the rent-loss parameters !. The …rst change is neutral in itself. To see the e¤ects of the second, we can …rst return to equation (10) and totally di¤erentiate it with respect to !, which yields
The right-hand side is positive provided d! is negative. Reducing the rent-loss parameters in any way (not necessarily proportionally) thus unambiguously lowers the amount of rents lost and raises welfare. After the tari¢ cation process is carried out, so it is q rather than p which adjusts, the welfare e¤ect of changes in ! is also given by (17), except that the shadow price of foreign exchange takes a slightly di¤erent form. 12
Thus tari¢ cation of quotas, to the extent that it reduces infra-marginal rent loss, is unambiguously welfareimproving.
1 0 Of course, it does not deal with the case of unilateral reform of tari¤s and quotas in a large economy, as in Neary (1995) , nor with that of multilateral reforms of tari¤s and quotas by a group of countries as in Woodland and Turunen-Red (2000) .
1 1 Strictly speaking, Proposition 1 does not nest the result of Corden and Falvey (1985) , whereby welfare is raised by any quota reduction provided all rents are retained and there are no tari¤s. In such a case the rule dq = !qd is clearly degenerate, since ! i is zero for all i. As Corden and Falvey showed in this case, for arbitrary positive dq the change in welfare is proportional to (p p ) 0 dq and so is positive. 1 2 Di¤erentiating (10) with the left-hand side equal to the undistorted trade expenditure function (1) and with m and q determined by (2) and (3) respectively, yields: ( 0 ) 1 eudu = (p p ) 0 qd!, where 0 = 1 t 0 m I (p p ) 0 (I !)q I 1 .
Conclusion
This paper has presented a new result on simultaneous reform of tari¤s and quotas in a distorted small open economy. The policy rule whose e¢ cacy is established in Proposition 1 involves a uniform proportionate relaxation of all distortions. It is convenient for practical advice, if somewhat surprising, that both tari¤s and quotas should be relaxed at the same rate, even though they are measured in di¤erent units. It is also intuitively plausible that the quotas which should be relaxed fastest are those which lose the most rent for the domestic economy. Combining these policy reform rules ensures that second-best problems are avoided and a welfare gain is assured.
As far as the practical applicability of the trade reform rule in Proposition 1 is concerned, it clearly requires that all trade policy instruments can be altered at once. On the other hand, it has minimal informational requirements: no parameters of the home economy need be known, and the only assumption which must be made is to rule out interactions between initial distortions and income e¤ects which are su¢ ciently perverse that the shadow price of foreign exchange is negative. Though unlikely to be directly applicable in any particular application, the result hopefully provides a benchmark with which actual liberalisation plans (whether in a unilateral or multilateral context) can be compared.
Appendix
As noted in the text, the formal underpinnings of Proposition 1 can be expressed as follows.
Lemma 3 
Suppose that F is strictly concave in x 1 and strictly convex in x 2 . Then, the expression x 0 F xx y is strictly positive.
Proof : The proof is immediate:
In the last line, x 0 1 F 11 x 1 is negative because F is strictly concave in x 1 and x 0 2 F 22 x 2 is positive because F is strictly convex in x 2 . Hence the whole expression is strictly positive.
Q.E.D.
Note that Lemma 3 does not yield Proposition 1 immediately. It can be checked that much of the expression for du in (16) can be written as x 0 F xx dx, where dx 1 = x 1 d and dx 2 = x 2 d , representing a uniform proportionate decrease in x 1 and a uniform proportionate increase in x 2 at the same rate. Lemma 3 then applies directly. However, there is an additional term in the expression for du in (16), (p p ) 0 (I !)!q, which is not covered by the Lemma. Fortunately, since all the elements of this term are individually positive, it does not a¤ect the result.
